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Abstract 
A disequilibrium econometric model of the California retail fluid milk 
market is constructed and estimated. The model is used to assess the impact 
of the suspension of government controls on the market. The results suggest 
that government controls have been adjusted to keep the market remarkably 
close to equilibrium. In fact, the controls appeared to have operated, on 
average, in favor of consumer interests. 
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1. Introduction 
With approximately 95 percent of all milk (meeting fluid use standards) 
priced under state and/or federal marketing orders, fluid milk markets are sub-
ject to more governmental regulation than most other markets in the United 
States. The traditional justification for these regulatory programs rests on 
two factors. First, milk is generally accepted as an essential food in the 
human diet; for this reason there is a need to insure an adequate supply. 
Second, the unique product characteristics of milk (e.g., high perishability) 
are believed to promote instability that inherently interferes with the sup-
ply process (Clarke, 1955). Thus, in the absence of regulation, it is often 
claimed that the public could not be confident of dairy product availability 
at reasonable prices. On the other hand, many consumers and economists who 
disagree with the second premise have come to view these programs as bene-
ficial only to producers and processors and not to consumers. 
Recently, there has been increased interest in evaluating milk marketing 
programs (Gordon and Hanke, 1978; MacAvoy, 1977). Previous analyses have con-
centrated typically on measuring the welfare gains associated with deregulation 
~ via surplus analysis. Such studies suggest implicitly that observed price is 
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~ nonmarket clearing due to government intervention and perhaps higher than that 
which would otherwise prevail as a result of market forces. Surprisingly little 
attention has been directed at determining quantitatively the actual effect of 
deregulation on price. One purpose of this paper is to examine this issue. 
Results show that regulated prices have been set remarkably close to equilibrium 
and that, on average, regulations have tended to slightly favor consumers rather 
than producers. 
To adequately assess the impact of the suspension of government controls, 
it is necessary first to identify the demand and supply relationships that exist 
in the market. Traditional econometric models, which are based on the assumption 
of market equilibrium, however, are clearly inappropriate in this case. Never-
theless, this point is seldom considered in simultaneous-equation econometric 
analyses of milk markets (Wilson and Thompson, 1967; Prato, 1973), although the 
potential importance of the issue is often acknowledged. Fortunately, recent 
developments in disequilibrium econometrics facilitate appropriate investiga-
tion. In particular, the California retail milk market provides an interesting 
case study since, until recently, this market has been regulated perhaps more 
than any other. The principal features of this milk stabilization plan are 
first described in detail below before specifying a model for the analysis. 
2. The California Milk Stabilization 
and Pooling Plan 
California wholesale and retail milk trade has been regulated since the 
1 1930s. Briefly, the plan may be described by its two basic components: 
(1) state-regulated producer prices for four different milk classes and state-
2 
regulated retail prices for Class I dairy products and (2) a pooling system 
which defines producer receipts as a function of production rights (quota) and 
I 
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the predetermined prices. The milk prices determined in (1) were established 
administratively after detailed periodic cost analyses and public hearings and, 
as Milligan (1978) notes, have consistently been the effective market prices. 
Under (2), the state guarantees producers a share in Class I sales and then 
acts essentially as a clearinghouse for all quota-related milk produced in 
California. The production or quota rights in (2) were originally allocated 
according to historical production with limited entry of new producers. 
Under the above plan, dairies ship milk according to their blend price 
which is determined in the following way. Each firm has production rights or 
a quota on which it is entitled to receive the wholesale price for market grade 
milk. Milk sold in amounts above the quota but within the historical produc-
tion base of the dairy brings a somewhat lower price. Overbase shipments com-
mand the lower Class IV milk price which, although unregulated by the state, 
~ is determined largely by federal support prices. The blend price of each dairy 
is then the average price per hundredweight determined as a weighted average of 
its quota, base, and overbase prices where the weights correspond to the rela-
tive size of each type shipment. 
The processors who receive dairy shipments utilize milk in fluid form or 
process it into a variety of products. The retail prices for Class I products 
are administered, while the prices of other products are unregulated. The ac-
tual supply of Class I products is determined by processors through dispensa-
tion of available market milk according to the Class I price and the unregulated 
price of other dairy products. 
Conceptually, the behavior of the wholesale and retail markets may be de-
picted as in figures 1 and 2, respectively. In figure 1, the highest wholesale 
price pq is received for quota shipments; the lower price pb is received for 
base shipments. With demand curve D and supply s1 , the price p* results which, 
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in the absence of general equilibrium considerations, is the same as the free-
market solution. As noted above, however, the most likely situation is that 
supply is actually characterized by, say, s2 so that the federal price support pf 
is operative on overbase shipments thus leading to production and sales at q • 
w 
In figure 2, the retail market for milk is divided into two major compo-
nents: Class I products (fluid milk and related products, such as cream and 
yogurt) and manufactured products (such as ice cream, cheese, and nonfat dry 
milk). Since milk is not perfectly substitutable between these two major end 
uses, a separate and distinct supply curve is indicated for each. 3 Suppose, 
initially, the free-market supplies are SI and Sm and demands are DI and Dm 
with free-market prices pi and p;, respectively. The effects of introducing 
a regulated price p~ in figure 2(a) may be evaluated as follows. First, if 
p~ < pi, the lower Class I price will lead to increased supply and thus lower 
~ price in the manufactured market. The lower price for milk used in manufactured 
products, in turn, leads to an increase in supply for Class I products. After 
succeeding rounds of adjustment, supply and quantity may be represented in 
figure 2 by S~ and q~, respectively, in the Class I market; and the resulting 
price and supply in the manufactured market may be represented by pr and Sr 
m m' 
. 1 4 respective y. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the regulated price is set above free-
* market equilibrium at p~ . At this price the resulting quantity of milk pur-
r* 
chased for use in Class I products would be determined by demand at q1 . All 
other milk would be forced into the manufactured market and thus increase 
supply and depress price there. 
From the above discussion, the Class I milk market in California [see 
figure 2(a)] apparently thus behaves as a standard disequilibrium model. Price 
and quantity are determined along the supply (demand) curve if regulated price 
'. ~ 
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is below (above) equilibrium price. Furthermore, it is possible to isolate the 
Class I market for econometric purposes so that the extent of this disequilibrium 
can be analyzed. That is, the complicated regulations of the wholesale milk 
market may be summed up by noting that production of market grade milk is essen-
tially prescribed by the state through wholesale prices and production rights 
and by federal price supports. Hence, the supply of Class I products can be 
conditioned simply on wholesale milk production ~· Second, the complicated 
interactions between the Class I and manufactured product markets can be fully 
accounted for by appropriately conditioning the supply and demand for Class I 
5 
milk products on the price of manufactured products. Thus, standard disequi-
librium econometric techniques become appropriate for the analysis. 
3. A Disequilibrium Framework 
Beginning with the work of Fair and Jaffee (1972), substantial effort has 
been devoted to the formulation and estimation of disequilibrium market models 
(Maddala and Nelson, 1974; Goldfeldt and Quandt, 1975; Hartley and Mallela, 
1977; Hartley, 1977). The most basic of these models consists of a demand 
equation, a supply equation, and an equation which identifies the quantity 
transacted as the smaller of quantity demanded and quantity supplied. This 
model may be written as 
s 
t 
t 1, 2, .•. , T 
where D S and Q are quantity demanded, quantity supplied, and quantity 
t' t, t 
(1) 
transacted, respectively; Pt is price with corresponding unknown parameters, 
S and S · and X is a colum.n vector of exogenous variables in addition to 1 2, t 
'. . \.. 
' 
8. 
price with unknown parameter vectors, 61 and 62, respectively. The error terms, 
£lt and £2t' are assumed to be normally distributed around zero means with con-
stant variances, ai and a;, respectively, with both serial and contemporaneous 
independence. 
The log-likelihood function corresponding to model (1) is given by 
ln L 
T 
E 
t=l 
(2) 
where f 0 5 (•) is the joint density of the subscripted variables. Sen (1976) 
t. t 
has demonstrated that a solution to the likelihood equations corresponding to a 
local maximum is consistent and asymptotically normal. Hartley (1977) shows 
that a local maximum of (2) may be calculated by a stepwise Gauss-Seidel type 
of iterative scheme. His method involves replacing the unobserved endogenous 
variables (Dt and St) by their respective expected values conditioned on ob-
served quantity and provisional parameter estimates, obtaining new parameter 
estimates by standard techniques, recomputing the conditional expectations, 
and proceeding iteratively until suitable convergence criteria are satisfied. 
4. The Model 
Using the maximum-likelihood technique developed by Hartley (1977), the 
estimated model for the retail Class I dairy product market in California under 
the disequilibrium hypothesis is 
D = 18.3 - .124 PI - .147 c + .0952 x 
(.248) (. 078) (.072) (.0028) 
s = 12.2 + .754 PI - .0133 p + . 303 q + .00684 T t m w 
(2.13) (.584) (.198) ( .112) (.0052) 
Q = min (D, S) 
' . 
' 
where 
D = logarithm of fluid milk demanded (gallons) 
P1 = logarithm of fluid milk price deflated by the consumer price 
index (dollars per gallon) 
p 
C = logarithm of cereal price deflated by the consumer price index 
(cents per 12 ounces) 
X school lunch dummy variable (one if school is in session; zero, 
otherwise) 
s = logarithm of fluid milk supplied (gallons) 
= logarithm of butter price deflated by the consumer price index 
m 
(cents per pound) 
~ = logarithm of market grade milk production (gallons) 
T time trend variable (July, 1974 = l; August, 1974 = 2; etc.) 
Q =logarithm of sales of fluid milk (gallons). 
9. 
To estimate this model, 30 monthly observations from mid-1974 through 1976 
are used. All price data are obtained from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The California consumer price index is taken from the California Department of 
Finance. Sales and production quantities are published by the California Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service. Asymptotic standard error estimates (reported 
in parentheses) are obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood 
function (2). All estimated elasticities are qualitatively sensible and, with 
the exception of manufacturing price in the supply equation, statistically 
significant. 
By way of comparison with results reported by other investigators, the 
elasticity estimates are also of reasonable magnitudes. Demand and supply 
are inelastic with respect to own price and manufacturing price, respectively. 
10. 
~ Supply, on the other hand, appears more responsive to changes in market grade 
production. By implication, changes in federal support prices, which are at 
least partially linked to manufacturing price, have a relatively small effect 
on California processors. Changes in quota variables and producer prices which 
impact on production, on the other hand, appear to shift the retail supply 
relationship significantly. 
' 
5. Impact of Market Regulation 
To evaluate the effect of milk market regulation, the estimated structural 
model can be used to predict comparable quantities demanded and supplied over 
the sample period (columns 1 and 2 of table 1). Examining these results, a 
systematic trend toward market disequilibrium is not apparent. In fact, dif-
ferences in observed and estimated quantities appear to be growing smaller 
over time. Furthermore, the market appears to be characterized by excess de-
mand in a majority of cases although actual magnitudes of predicted disequi-
libria vary substantially. 
To further examine the effect of regulations, the equilibrium quantity 
and price are simulated from the reduced form under the hypothesis of equi-
librium corresponding to the above structural estimates (columns 4 and 6, 
respectively). Not surprisingly, the agreement between equilibrium price and 
observed price in column 5 is not close due to the highly inelastic nature 
of both demand and supply. Interestingly, however, departures of the pre-
dicted equilibrium price from observed price are not one-sided in sign or 
magnitude and, as a result, the average difference is only about 2 percent. 
The results presented in table 1 thus do not seem to support the contention 
~ that the market has been characterized by persistent excess supply during 
.. 
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TABLE 1 
Predicted Supply, Demand, and Price Under Disequilibrium and Equilibrium 
July, 1974. to December, 1976 
Time Quantity Price 
Eeriod Demand Su2ElY Observed Eguilibrium Observed Eguilibrium 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1,000 gallons dollars Eer half gallon 
197.:. 
Jul,. 54,922 59,131 54,366 55,431 0.71695 0.66563 
Aug. 55,044 58,639 55,678 55,470 0.71760 0.67439 
Sep. 60,356 57,285 55, 713 59,944 0.71755 0.75821 
Oct. 60,083 57,780 59,653 59,770 0.71755 0.74839 
Nov. 59,517 56,573 57,048 59,110 0.71580 0.75651 
Dec. 59,523 56,918 55,705 59,153 o. 71670 0.75362 
1975 
Jan. 59,614 57,114 59,064 59,249 0.71455 0.75069 
Feb. 59,485 55,618 53,024 58,934 0.71435 o. 76987 
~lar. 59, 701 57,605 56,351 59,367 0.71360 0.74650 
Apr. 59,697 57, 700 56,324 59,368 0. 71355 0. 74601 
c Ma:: 59,946 57,856 58,026 59,575 0.69640 0.73202 June· 54,500 57,904 52,900 54,814 0.69615 0.66465 Juh 54,653 58,488 55,054 55,010 0.69560 0.66011 
Au[:. 54,68~ 58,533 54,632 55,040 0.69560 0.66024 
Sep. 60, 3.:,9 57,340 58,159 59,839 0.69565 0.74485 
Oct. 60,447 57,671 60,980 59 ,960 0.69545 0.74221 
'.\ov. 60,565 56,881 55,795 59,954 0.69545 0.75455 
Dec. 60,669 57,431 58,472 60,110 0.69550 0.74932 
197h 
Ja:-:. 59. 367 61,931 60,115 59,607 0.69500 0.67282 
Feb. 60,976 57,823 54,530 60,425 0.69395 0.74660 
Mar. 61,090 60,031 60,541 60,806 0.69435 o. 72090 
Apr. 61,151 60,594 57,909 60,930 0.69555 0.71611 
~:aY 61,375 61,471 56,791 61,222 o. 69545 0. 70952 
June 55,880 61,258 54,936 56,367 0.69550 0.64862 
Juh· 55,990 61,586 57,184 56,489 0.69255 0.64486 
Au~. 56,147 61,475 56,793 56,609 0.69160 0.64747 
Sep. 61_, 939 60,215 59. 513 61,526 0.69070 0.72889 
(let • 61,978 60,747 61,482 61,628 0.69430 0. 72669 
~~0\". 62,066 6(;, 102 60,h02 61,618 0.69335 0.73495 
8E- C • 62' 02:. 60,652 61,060 61,648 0.6933(1 0.7281(1 
:\vt-ragt 59,125 58,812 57,280 58,966 0.70lb) 0. 71678 
. . .. 
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c. recent years. In point of fact, the market appears to be in a state of excess 
demand on the average. 
' 
To determine the importance of the effects of the Class I milk quota in 
California and investigate the real magnitude of the effects, the welfare analy-
sis in table 2 is developed. Results show the producer and consumer welfare 
effects of removing the Class I quota and price regulations and returning to 
equilibrium in the retail market (given the existence of controls in the whole-
sale market). In the context of the recent results developed by Just and Hueth 
(1979), the producer effects pertain to milk processors and retailers alone 
since supply estimates are conditioned on wholesale market transactions. Dairy 
farmers who sell in the wholesale market would presumably not experience sizable 
(if any) welfare effects from removal of Class I quotas since milk transactions 
in the wholesale market even at the margin are determined largely by federal 
price supports. The consumer effects in table 2, on the other hand, represent 
welfare effects on the consuming public and are partial in the sense that cereal 
prices are assumed to be unaffected by adjustment of Class I milk prices to equi-
librium levels. 
As is evident from table 2, the welfare effects of deregulation are quite 
small. In per capita terms, the consumer effects are never larger than 40 cents 
per capita per month. Furthermore, the Class I marketing plan appears to favor 
the consumer. Removal of quotas would reduce consumers' real income by an 
average of only $3.2 million per month. On the other hand, producers (meaning 
processors and retailers) would gain less than twice that amount. The overall 
welfare effects of $2.8 million per month are thus not large and may be a small 
price to pay for the associated reduction in price variability (from a retail 
price standard deviation of 1.0 cents per half gallon to over 3.9 cents per 
half gallon). 
• • • 
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' TABLE 2 
Welfare Gains From Deregulation 
July, 1974, to December, 1976 
Time period Consumers Producers Net 
1 000 dollars 
1974 
Jul\' 4,786 - 3,079 1,707 
August 4,982 - 5,304 322 
September - 7,608 15,623 8,014 
October - 3,787 3,988 201 
November - 6,415 10,062 3,647 
December - 6,863 13,038 6,174 
1975 
Januar,· - 4,445 4,754 308 
February - 9,921 21,246 11,325 
>!arch - 6,282 11, 354 5,071 
April - 6, 285 11, 333 5,047 
~:ay - 5,562 7,975 2,412 
June 1,769 939 2,709 
Juh 3,945 - 4,004 58 
' 
August 3,503 - 2,955 548 
Septe!'.lber - 7,335 9,920 2,58~ 
l October - 4,631 3,142 - 1,488 :\o\•ernber - 1,026 16,052 6,689 December - 7,916 10,374 2,458 
1976 
Januan· 3,109 - 3,849 739 
Februar·; -10,428 20,091 9,662 
~!arc)1 - 3,479 3,851 372 
April - 5,100 9,503 4,403 
Ma" - 5,366 11, 817 6,450 
Junt: 3,891 - 2'118 l, 772 
Jul·; 6,109 
- 6,926 816 
August 5,184 - 5,400 216 
September - 6,552 9,320 2,767 
October - 4,137 4,330 193 
!'<C!ve'.7lber - 6,103 7,475 l, 3 i2 
Decc·:oihier - 4,867 5,644 776 
1\ver<J~L - 3,202 5,970 2,767 
.. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of a quota which apparently leads to 
a classic case of market disequilibrium (given controls which exist in related 
markets). Although a great deal of consumer criticism has been levied against 
14. 
the Class I milk market quota, the results of this paper show that controls have 
been adjusted to keep the market remarkably close to equilibrium. Furthermore, 
on net, the quota appears to have operated in favor of consumer interests at 
the expense of processors and retailers. Finally, it must be pointed out that 
a major objective of milk market controls in California has been to stabilize 
prices as implied by the very title of the plan. The school lunch program, 
for example, has been an important factor leading to seasonal variability in 
demand; consumers would face milk prices of much less stability in the absence 
~ of Class I market controls (table 1). The benefits of stability, of course, 
are not reflected in the welfare effects in table 2. If the producer group, 
for example, is relatively risk averse, then the present plan which achieves 
stability at the expense of producers while benefiting consumers may well be 
socially preferable, even in a Pareto sense, to free-market equilibrium. 
.. ~ ~· 
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FOOTNOTES 
tGiannini Foundation Paper No. 
1For a complete description of the legislative history and many institutional 
features of this plan, see California Department of Food and Agriculture (1974). 
2class I dairy products are made from market grade milk which is produced 
under more rigid sanitary standards than manufacturing grade milk. 
3Actually, the higher grade of milk used for Class I products may be freely 
substituted for lower grades in manufactured products but not vice versa. Thus, 
both supply curves may have distinct discontinuities at these points where the 
price of milk used in manufactured products becomes higher than that of milk 
used in Class I products. Consistent with historical data, the diagrams are 
depicted only for the alternative case. 
4rt also seems reasonable that demands in each market may adjust in response 
to changes in price in the other market. However, the following arguments and 
resulting model are not substantively altered by this phenomenon (other than 
simply conditioning the demand curves on the other prices). 
5rn the results that follow, the manufactured product price is not used as 
a determinant of Class I product demand since the statistical analysis did not 
attribute any significance to it. 
.. " , .. 
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